Africa is moving towards more economic integration, leading to the conclusion of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA). The trade remedies annex, essential to ensure economic survival of industries in member states, must still be developed. This article proposes a gradual approach to achieve integration and a regional trade defence system.
When fully implemented, the TFTA will create a market of 626 million customers and an aggregate GDP of USD1.2 trillion. In 2014, the total merchandise exports by TFTA members reached USD145 billion (1 per cent of global exports) and merchandise imports of USD211 billion (1.5 per cent of global imports).
The TFTA adopted an innovative and improved approach to African integration that sought to learn from previous African experiences. The Preamble of the Agreement indicates that it was built on three pillars: market access, industrial development, and trade facilitation. The strong focus on non-market access issues can potentially expedite African integration implementation. Nevertheless, the outcome of phase I of the negotiations was less than the planned objectives. The negotiations started with a very ambitious text that included progressive provisions but ended up with a consensus-based text. These negotiations could have brought many important added values to African TDI systems, one of which is the harmonization of the different rules on trade defence instruments (TDIs), include anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard action, in the three blocks that constitute the TFTA -the Common Market for what constitute "substantially all trade" is challenging and the WTO Dispute Settlement Un-Introduction The TFTA proposes to establish a free trade area (FTA) between the 26 countries that form part of the three regional economic communities (RECs). This would include removing customs duties between member states. 6 In the transformation towards a single FTA, while normal customs duties will be (gradually) removed, TDIs may still be applied.
One of the major questions is whether TFTA members should have the right to use TDIs against other member states or whether TDIs should only be applied to non-Members, especially as the TFTA progresses over time to become a customs union. Another important question, regardless the answer to the first question, is how to achieve this.
TDIs could be maintained in the T-FTA. TDIs do not fall under "other restrictive measures"
in Article XXIV of GATT. The current practice of major FTAs confirms that Members could maintain the application of TDIs as they are not categorised as prohibited measures by Article XXIV. If TDIs are to be removed, this could put limitation on FTA Members in applying legitimate trade tools that may be required at the early stages of trade liberalization. Up to now, there was no decision from the WTO DSU that rendered the application of TDIs on intra-FTA trade as non-legitimate. 5 Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles para.50. 6 Art. XXIV of GATT 1994. TDI negotiations were one of the contentious issues in the negotiations process. It proved that there were many different approaches and conceptions toward TDIs, often related to differences in the level of development, the application of TDIs at national level and the understanding of the importance of TDIs to regional integration.
Several of the smaller Members were in favour of simple and favourable TDI rules since they have neither national laws on TDIs nor technical capacities or investigating authorities. On the other hand, the more advanced economies such as Egypt and South Africa were supportive of an advanced TDI system.
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As a compromise, at the end of stage I Members adopted a simplified set of TDI rules on a transitional basis and decided to postpone negotiations on whether to develop detailed rules to the second stage of negotiations.
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Comparing the original proposal against the final outcome provides the a number of stark contrasts, ranging from the establishment of a regional authority versus maintaining national authorities; detailing investigation procedures versus only including generalities; removing or maintaining the use of TDIs between TFTA members; the use of trade restrictive practices other than TDIs, especially to protect infant industries; and what role public interest should play in investigations. We now consider each of these issues.
B. Establishment of Regional Investigating Authority vs. Maintaining the Status Quo
The initial proposal was very progressive in the sense that it sought to overcome the national limitations of Members. One of its most important features was that it provided for the establishment of a sub-committee on Trade Remedies (CTR) that was supposed to act as a quasiregional investigating authority. 9 It was planned that this regional authority would assume the duties of national authorities in conducting investigations, including the collection of data; the determination of the existence of dumping, subsidisation or increased imports; the determination of injury; and the need to take action to remedy the injury in accordance with the Where Members do not have national authorities, the Sub-Committee could undertake the investigation on the Member's behalf. At the signing of the TFTA, no Sub-Committee was established. The creation of a TDI Sub-Committee could have resulted in discrimination against non-Members and favouritism toward Members as manifested in different regional groups including NAFTA. Although this discrimination could bring negative effects to global trade and welfare, it can positively support regional integration in Africa through increasing intra-trade.
C. Detailed Investigation Procedures vs. Generalities
The initial draft gave very broad room for applicants to lodge applications. The investigation starts after application to the Sub-Committee by either a national or regional industry or a TFTA Member on behalf of a domestic or regional industry. sector and its institutions in some TFTA Members. As regards definitions, the initial Agreement adopted a broad approach. The Annex defined "injury" and "threat of injury" as "eco- The text authorised the sub-committee to order enterprises doing business or directly affecting trade and industries in the TFTA area to ensure and maintain conditions for fair competition and for sustainable human development. This is very broad in nature and can have important implications on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Although such FDI will bring positive economic and social impacts to host countries, it may be difficult to interpret these conditions and may be discouraging for investment because of the additional costs associated therewith.
Additionally, the Sub-Committee could recommend any other measures in the public interest, consistent with the appropriate protection of a domestic or regional industry, 34 without specifying what these other measures could entail.
The initial Agreement included some provisions on competition which could have acted as a substitute to TDIs in certain cases, such as predatory pricing, and consequently would have supported integration objectives. 35 . However, these provisions were not included in the final Agreement.
F. Pubic Interest Clause
The Sub-Committee decisions must take into consideration public interest in TDIs and competition policy related decisions, consistent with the appropriate protection of a domestic or regional industry. 36 This provision seemed to be an open door to include any other measures not specified in this Article, which might also be able to protect the domestic and regional industry. It could also mean that the Sub-Committee may decide not to impose TDIs when the imposition would be against the public interest, consumers and producers importing intermediate components. not to impose a definitive measure is a decision the authorities of the importing Member must take, and provide that it "is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members". 39 This indicates that it is not compulsory that a definitive measure be imposed even if all the requirements for imposition have been met. 40 The Safeguard Agreement requires in Article 3.2 that the investigating authority provide an opportunity to all parties to submit their views whether or not the application of safeguard measures will be in the public interest. National or public interest can differ depending on the eye of the beholder and it is therefore important that the concept be properly defined before it can be applied as a concept. 41 Brink has indicated that trade remedies "relate to international trade, and as dumping [or subsidised imports] results in a negative impact on the industry producing the like product, yet a positive effect on downstream users and consumers, national interest in such investigations has to be considered with special circumspect. This may mean that the national economic interest must be considered" in more detail than public interest.
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Major jurisdictions differ in the way they oblige the national investigating authorities to consider public interest in their investigations 43 as explained in the coming sections. There is a room for incorporating this clause to achieve the policy objectives of the tripartite Members.
III. MAJOR REGIONAL TDIS SYSTEMS
A. Introduction The TFTA negotiation process revealed that Members envisaged drawing lessons from and adopting some of the approaches adopted by other regional blocks. Several TFTA meetings discussed how other FTAs have been able to develop and implement user-friendly mechanisms for the three TDIs that are WTO-consistent and suited to regional realities. Members are requested to provide sufficient information regarding the proposed action or measure to be taken, including a description of the action or measure to be taken; the reasons for undertaking the action or measure; and the intended date of implementation and the duration of the action or measure. There is no regional investigating authority in ASEAN. National investigating authorities conduct the investigations.
C. The European Union
The EU is one of the most integrated economic blocks in the world. The EU is based on Treaty-based commitments with supranational organisations that sets its objectives and manage the integration process among its Members.
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Since the EU is at a level of a customs union with a common external tariff, TDIs are prohibited on intra-trade. 53 What differentiates the EU from other customs unions is the creation of a single market with free movement of factors of production, including labour and capital.
Although the EU has prohibited the application of TDIs on intra-trade, it is still one of the major users of TDIs against external trade.
54
The EU TDI regulations are part of the Common Commerce Policy. They are governed by the"acquis communautaire" which is the entire body of European laws including all the treaties, regulations and directives, as well as judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
The EU system differentiates between anti-dumping and countervailing measures on one hand and safeguard measures on the other hand. The EU law and applications go beyond the provisions of the WTO. This is manifested mainly in certain aspects related to invocation criteria, investigation procedures, the application of the "Union interest test" 68 and the "lesser duty rule". 69 The EU responds to WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) rulings against through regular updates of its regulations. 70 This confirms the robust nature of regional TDI systems and the need for continuous improvements.
The application of the Union interest test rule is one of the features of the EU TDI system and is usually considered in every single investigation, although it seldom affects the outcome.
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The EU seeks to ensure that the implementation of TDIs will not undermine the aggregate interests in the Union. Consequently, TDIs measures should be imposed only in cases that would benefit the national producers and not significantly negatively affect the EU consumers. The investigations analyse all the economic interests involved, including the positive / negative effects on domestic industry, users, consumers and traders of the product concerned.
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The right of defence is one of the EU fundamental rights. The EC introduced in 2007 the position of "independent hearing officer". 73 The hearing officer's principal task is to safeguard the effective exercise of rights in trade proceedings before the EC and to ensure that trade proceedings are handled impartially, fairly and timely. 74 The hearing officer ensures that every person has the right to be heard before the imposition of measures that could affect him. The Hearing Officer advises the EC regarding the follow-up of his recommendations and, when necessary, on possible remedies and recommendations on issues relating to the rights of interested parties. 75 Access to the hearing officer may decrease the tendency to revert to the judicial system and the DSB in cases involving the EC.
The results of all TDIs investigation are published in the EU's Official Journal. 76 The EC has an obligation to report its TDI activities to the EU Parliament. 77 It maintains a public website on background information, information on investigations, and measures statistics 78 and has recently developed a system whereby all information in an investigation is available to interested parties on a password-protected website.
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A Helpdesk was set up to respond to requests for information by SMEs. 80 The TDI website also specifically highlights an SME's role in TDI proceedings and provides simplified technical advice.
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Having a regional judicial system is one of the most important features of the EU system. It is an important requirement when TDI investigations are conducted at the regional level. All The NAFTA TDI system takes into consideration the asymmetry between the US and Canada (two developed Members) and Mexico (a developing Member). This is manifested in the establishment of the Bi-National review mechanism which is considered a way to overcome the challenges that may arise from the different legal system in the three Members.
NAFTA has adopted an innovative hybrid approach in dealing with TDI investigations and reviews. While the investigation functions are conducted by national authorities, its decisions are subject to reviews by bi-national committees within the NAFTA structure. 105 The review presents a new layer of scrutiny and accountability, which subjects national authorities to an important constraint. This distinctive feature of NAFTA has to be considered in context, as the jurisdiction of the bi-national panel is limited to examining whether the final determinations of investigating authorities were in accordance with its national laws. 106 It bases its decisions on whether the party has followed the standards of judicial review of administrative agency determinations. 107 Although it takes the judicial review role of national laws, it is procedural by nature and doesn't create new laws as it only applies the general legal principles of the court of the importing Party. 108 The decisions of this panel do not seek to harmonise the national laws of the three Members.
The decisions of the panel are binding for its parties. 109 Parties may not appeal decisions to the national courts, nor may national legislatures enact legislation to overturn those decisions. 110 However, in very limited circumstances these decisions could be subject to review by an ad hoc Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) comprised of three judges from the three Members. 111 So far here have been three ECC requests, all by the US, and in each instance the challenge was unsuccessful. 112 Th bi-national panel system improves certainty in the trade relations between the three countries.
The creation of the bi-national review mechanism resulted in preferential treatment for Members of NAFTA compared with third parties. In a study conducted on CUSFTA for the period 1989-1994 it was shown that two thirds of Canadian appeals against US TDI actions before bi-national panels were remanded compared with one-third for non-NAFTA countries before the US Court of International Trade. 113 Although the study is relatively old it can indicate, in general, the favourable treatment Members of RTAs receive as a result of the creation of a review mechanism for national authorities' determinations. In addition to the review of national administrative body determinations, the bi-national panel may review amendments to the national laws of Members on TDIs that are challenged for inconsistency with NAFTA and the WTO, 115 although this provision has never been invoked.
TDI investigations are still conducted by the national authorities. In the US and Canada there are separate bodies that deal with the anti-dumping or countervailing investigations and injury determinations. 116 In safeguards, the decision could be affected by political considerations.
The ITC conducts safeguard investigations upon request from the national industry, and sends its recommendations to the President of the US, who can accept or reject the recommendations of the ITC or decide to adopt an alternative decision. 117 In Canada, the Tribunal may recommend to the Government safeguard measures, which may be accepted or rejected. 118 This lengthy and political process in Canada and the US may affect the frequency of using safeguard measures, but it also accounts for political considerations that could be taken into consideration before imposing such measures. In contrast to its two partners Mexico has a single investigating authority responsible for all aspects of all three TDIs.
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All investigating authorities' decisions in the three countries may also be appealed to a national judicial review. 120 Mexican law and practice must be interpreted in conjunction with the WTO Agreements, whereas in the US and Canada national law is understood to being superior to the WTO Agreements in the event of differences. In NAFTA, there is less regard to the effect of TDIs on consumer welfare, as the main priority is the protection of domestic industries.
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The USA previously expressed "philosophical concerns" with a Canadian proposal to give more weight to consumers' interests wondering how judgments on legitimate domestic concerns would be made, and whether national decisions would be challengeable under the DSU.
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On the other hand, Canadian legislation requires that public interest should be considered upon request of any interested parties or through the initiative of the investigating authority, typically through the application of the lesser duty rule. At present there is a deficiency in the jurisdictional regimes governing TDIs at both national and regional levels in Africa. Although the African TDI systems are different from each other, the systems that do exist are simplistic and generally only restate WTO obligations.
The importance of a sound TDI strategy in Africa is emphasised by the current global reemergence of protectionism in some developed countries, including the US. The end of the transitional period in 2016 for China's accession protocol, and the bilateral agreements between African countries and China to grant the latter "market economy status" may also contribute to increased low-priced imports into Africa. An effective TDI system could limit the negative effects arising from such imports.
Additionally, the majority of African countries do not have competition policies in place, which leaves national industries vulnerable to foreign competition, further highlighting the importance of TDIs. Furthermore, it has to be noted that in times of economic crisis, coun- tries feel more encouraged to make use of protectionist measures including TDIs. This could pose some risks to African exports.
A. The Most Ambitious Scenario
The most ambitious scenario would be to establish a regional investigating authority to which Member States will delegate authority to carry on investigations both in connection to Members and non-Members.
This scenario would follow the EU model of integration where economic and trade policies are gradually harmonised and regional bodies are entrusted with trade relations.
Despite the significant variation in the levels of integration and development between the two blocks, the EU TDI system could be the most conducive for the TFTA in the long run, mainly when the Customs Union stage is reached. This submission is made while recognizing the substantial differences between Members of the EU and Members of the tripartite area. Although characterized by a low pace of integration, the African linear integration model is seeking to imitate the EU model, especially from a historical perspective.
Small economies in Africa have strong motivation to integrate their limited economies in a way similar to the EU model in order to reap the benefits of economies of scale. Additionally, African countries might find it necessary to pool their limited financial resources to achieve their integration objectives and build regional institutions, including a functioning regional TDIs entity. This scenario, which is practically the actualization of the first draft proposal, will face many challenges mainly due to the fact that only few African countries have TDI legislation and functioning institutions, a lack of sufficient financial and technical resources as well as the perception of the lack of importance of this system. This major step may need to be preceded by many gradual steps to harmonize rules and deepen integration between Members.
It is acknowledged that previous experience in Africa indicates that this ambitious step may face major challenges. Many African countries deal with regional trade liberalization provisions as soft law and they may be inclined not to implement decisions of regional bodies, including trade remedies and dispute settlement bodies. The model of the SADC tribunal and the consequences of its decisions against Zimbabwe 133 may call for caution from African de-cision-makers. Dealing with the sovereignty concerns of African countries through gradual integration and by subjecting the decisions of the regional body to approval by the council of Ministers of the T-FTA may help address this challenge to certain extent.
Reaching a deeper level of economic integration, which permits the free movement of the factors of production, may require the abolition of TDIs, other than the limited use of bilateral safeguards, on intra-trade.
B. The Lowest Common Denominator
In the context of the TFTA negotiations, the lowest common denominator will be to strengthen cooperation between Member States in the area of TDI investigations without having provisions regarding the creation of regional bodies. This scenario could be the easiest to follow as it will not require any major changes to the status quo. Nevertheless, it will not bring any change to the current situation where African industries are vulnerable to unfair trade measures. It is submitted that this scenario would have negative consequences on the pace of regional integration and the economic interests of Members. In order to maximize the economic benefits of such scenario, it is suggested that Members agree on certain provisions that can provide preferential treatment to each other such as the lesser duty rule and the public interest test.
The three WTO TDIs Agreements grant some flexibility in the design of regional TDI systems. Applying this, African countries can incorporate provisions on higher de minimis and negligibility margins, shorter period of application of TDIs against TFTA Members, and flexible safeguards provisions. This would decrease the resort to TDIs against Members while retaining the protection against third parties, thus supporting regional economic integration and providing African economies with a comparative advantage over third parties.
C.
The Gradual Approach A gradual approach to both integration and a regional TDI system could be the most suitable in the TFTA context. In such case, the TFTA legal system would follow the same initial structure that was suggested at the beginning of the TFTA negotiations, i.e., it would consist of a three-tier approach which would include general provisions on TDIs, supported by an Annex setting out principles, and further clarified by guidelines which could be formulated at a later stage. This model resembles the EU legal system consisting of regulations and directives subject to the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice.
This gradual approach may be supported by the fact that Africa is pursuing a linear model of integration that in the long run would lead to a model resembling that of the EU.
134 Considering the European TDI system when designing the African system may be appropriate for several reasons. First, the creation of the African Economic Community will necessitate the free movements of goods, services, capital and labour 135 and would, in the long term, imply the abolition of TDIs on intra-trade while applying unified rules on imports from third parties.
Second, the EU reached its high level of integration through almost 70 years of incremental integration steps. Intra-trade TDIs were permitted during the early stages of integration and were phased out as integration between Members increased. It is not foreseen that TDIs will be removed on African intra-trade the short or medium term. However, it should be envisaged to remove intra-trade TDIs at a later stage when integration is deepened and consolidated, culminating in the implementation of the African Customs Union.
Third, the EU integration model is flexible. Many smaller Eastern European countries joined the EU in the past decade and now abide by the rules and regulations of the EU. The same could be true for Africa where many African countries can decide to deepen their integration at consecutive stages. The T-FTA model is envisaged to be expanded and merged with other integration endeavours in the continent to reach the AEC.
Fourth, the EU TDI system attaches significant importance to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Such enterprises more than 95% of African industries. Africa can incorporate several of the capacity building techniques applied by the EU in equipping its largely SME industries to deal with TDI issues.
Fifth, the EU TDI system gives considerable importance to consumer welfare and intermediate industries through the application of the lesser duty rule, the public interest test and price undertaking provisions. This could be replicated in Africa where the application of TDIs should bear the minimum impact on consumers and intermediate industries.
In order to achieve the long-term objective of a single, integrated African TDI system, it is proposed that African countries should follow a gradual approach that takes care of the sig- 2. In the second step, African countries could set up regional investigating authorities in each of the three RECs. These regional authorities could benefit from the accumulated expertise of regional economic powers with established rules and practices in TDIs.
Egypt, Kenya and South Africa are the most viable candidates for this process, although personnel should be drawn from all members of the relevant REC. These countries would have to coordinate closely with the Members of their RECs in investigations. At present, this recommendation may face some challenges due to sovereignty concerns from Member States.
3. The third step would be to agree on establishing a TFTA-wide regional body to deal with TDIs. The mandate of this regional body should be limited to reviewing the determinations of the national or REC investigating authorities according to national and regional laws. This could be done in a manner similar to the bi-national committee in NAFTA.
4. The final step would be to establish a fully-fledged TFTA-wide regional investigating body with full powers to conduct investigations on behalf of all Members and which can accumulate more experience within a shorter time frame. This is a long-term process that can only take place when the long-term objective of establishing a Tripartite customs union has been attained and when TDIs are prohibited on intra-trade.
Because the TFTA is geographically large and its physical infrastructure sometimes lacking, at present there is often little trade between TFTA members. Indeed, WTO statistics show that intra-African trade accounts for only 12% of total trade. This suggests that serious consideration could be given to frequent application of Article 4.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 16.2 of the ASCM, which both provide that the domestic market "may be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory."
Injury can then be determined on the basis of this sub-market and duties may be imposed only in respect of dumped or subsidised imports into that sub-market. This would prevent the destruction of the industry in one part of the TFTA where such regional market only forms a small part of the total TFTA industry and injury cannot be proven to the whole of the TFTA industry. It could also make it easier to gather the necessary injury information as there will be fewer producers in the sub-market.
V. CONCLUSIONS
TDIs can be regarded as tools to safeguard the benefits of economic regional integration and ensuring that the integration is not undermined by low cost imports from trading partners.
While there will be many challenges in setting up a regional investigating authority that would conduct trade remedy investigations on behalf of the whole of the TFTA region, experience in territories like the EU has indicated that this goal that can be achieved over time.
This submission is made while recognising the important differences between the African and European integration models. It may be expedient to first establish national authorities that would later be absorbed into regional authorities in each of the three main RECs (COMESA, EAC and SADC), and that these regional authorities can later be amalgamated into a single TFTA authority with a regional tribunal to review decisions.
These REC authorities, and later the single TFTA authority, should be staffed with qualified personnel from all over the region. Establishing a regional investigating authority can bring many technical and economic benefits to African countries.
Special attention should be given to invoking the sub-market provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the ASCM to ensure that TDI measures can be invoked in instances where the industry in a specific geographical area of the TFTA is injured by dumped or subsidised
imports, yet where injury cannot be proven to the whole of the TFTA industry.
In the meantime, African countries are encouraged to work on enhancing the capacities of the private sector and especially SMEs, and improving the flow of information between governments and stakeholders. African countries should also increase their engagement in the WTO negotiations and participate in WTO Rules meetings to improve the WTO rules to the benefit of developing countries.
